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ABSTRACT
HOW DOES ANXIETY AFFECT COGNITIVE CONTROL?
PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE CONTROL UNDER STATE ANXIETY

by

Youcai Yang

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018
Under the Supervision of Christine L. Larson

Cognitive control is a construct that prioritizes how we process stimuli and information
and execute behaviors to flexibly and efficiently adapt to internal goals and external
environmental changes. A recent theory, the Dual Mechanism of Control (DMC), distinguishes
this phenomenon by two distinct cognitive control operations: proactive control and reactive
control (Braver, 2012). Anxiety increases the allocation of attentional and working memory
resources to threat-related stimuli, which impairs cognitive performance (Sarason, 1988), but
additional work is needed to assess how anxiety impacts these two distinct forms of cognitive
control. In this study, I examined how state anxiety affected proactive control, using the AXcontinuous performance task (AX-CPT), and reactive control, using the classic Stroop task. The
results showed that state anxiety inhibited proactive control in AX-CPT test, but increased
reactive control in the Stroop task. Ultimately, by completing this study, we will better
understand how anxiety impacts the proactive and reactive control.
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Introduction
Cognitive control is defined as the process of regulation, coordination and management
of thoughts and action in accordance with internally maintained behavioral goals and flexibly
responding to salient environmental demands (Braver, 2012). It mainly includes attention,
inhibitory control, working memory, cognitive flexibility, planning, reasoning and problem
solving (Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Diamond, 2013). Cognitive control can help
people respond to detected stimuli quickly, override prepotent responses, ignore irrelevant
information that interferes with the current task, or perform multiple tasks simultaneously. For
example, cognitive control can assist you if you are hungry but you do not have permission to
take your roommate’s pizza, or if you are looking for your white car in the parking lot, in which
case you need to select your car among all the other white cars while ignoring cars of other
colors (Miller & Cohen, 2001). In the laboratory, one classic way to index cognitive control is
the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). When a person is instructed to name the colors of the ink or font
that the word “GREEN” is presented in (e.g., green or red ink), much more time is required when
the color of the ink is incongruent with the meaning of the word (e.g., “green” presented in red
ink), compared to when the color of ink matches the printed word. Therefore, cognitive control is
important for us to react to important stimuli quickly (such as avoiding danger) and to override
distracting task-irrelevant stimuli to stay on task to achieve internal goals.
Due to the ever changing balance of internal goal-directed behavior and stimulus-driven
demands of the external environment, cognitive control must be flexible to adapt to changes and
execute tasks efficiently. This flexibility allows goal-directed actions to be facilitated and
conflicting actions to be suppressed. Cognitive control varies within and across individuals
(Braver, 2012). Cognitive control can be changed, developed and improved across the lifespan as
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it is affected by experience and events (Diamond, 2013). Ideally proactive and reactive control
are optimally balanced to appropriately react to salient stimuli, but also complete necessary
tasks. At its most adaptive cognitive control is implemented to shift flexibly as the situation
demands.
That cognitive control can shift between internally-focused goals and externally-driven
stimuli in the same task under different instructions and conditions raises the possibility that
there may be two different cognitive control processes. Although many studies have been
conducted to clarify these mechanisms (Braver, 2012; Engle & Kane, 2003; Goldman-Rakic,
Cools, & Srivastava, 1996; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Monsell &
Driver, 2000; O'Reilly, 2006), research in this area is still in its early stages. A recent theory, the
dual mechanisms of control (DMC) attempts to provide a framework for different cognitive
control processes by two operational models: proactive control and reactive control (Braver,
2012). Proactive control is conceptualized as a goal-driven system which maintains task-related
information in order to bias attention and guide perception and action systems to prepare for the
oncoming occurrence of a cognitively demanding event. Reactive control is conceptualized as
stimulus-driven control that is mobilized only as needed. When salient stimulus is attended, a
transient consequential response can be made. Reactive control is referred to as a ‘late correction
mechanism’ by Braver (2012).
The advantage of DMC is that the computational tradeoff based on the benefits and costs
of proactive and reactive control allows information to be processed efficiently (Braver, 2012).
Under proactive control, a goal can be triggered in advance and maintained until the appearance
of a salient stimulus, decreasing internal and external interference, flexibly adjusting and
facilitating information processing. However, goal maintenance is costly; it consumes resources
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and occupies capacity-limited working memory stores, which is required for focal attention
(Cowan, 2001; McElree, 2001; Oberauer, 2002). In contrast, under reactive control, goal
representation is only active after the onset of a stimulus, which is transient and efficient, but the
disadvantage is that attention will be easily reallocated whenever there is a trigger event, which
can interrupt the execution of a goal.
The DMC model is supported by neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies (Braver,
2012; Lesh et al., 2013; Paxton, Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2008). The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is
important for cognitive control, especially top-down control needed to reallocate attention and
execute behaviors towards a goal (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Desimone & Duncan,
1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001). The dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) plays a key role in the
maintenance of goals and action execution (Asaad, Rainer, & Miller, 2000; Watanabe, 1990).
The ability to mount a sustained pattern of neural activity to maintain a goal has been repeatedly
shown in DLPFC in non-human primates (Goldman-Rakic, 1995) and humans (MacDonald,
Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Conversely, the bottom-up reactivation of task goals is
mediated by interference detection and conflict monitoring regions like the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Patients with schizophrenia
who showed impairments of the DLPFC and associated circuitry, such as the parietal cortex,
exhibit cognitive control deficits (D. M. Barch, Carter, Braver, & et al., 2001; Cohen, Barch,
Carter, & Servan-Schreiber, 1999a; Cohen, Braver, & O'Reilly, 1996; Cohen & ServanSchreiber, 1992). Based on the DMC theory, proactive control may be represented by sustained
activation of the DLPFC, which supports the active maintenance of task goals and facilitates the
top-down response to meet cognitive (Cohen, Barch, Carter, & Servan-Schreiber, 1999b)
demands. In contrast, reactive control may be reflected as a transient activation of the DLPFC
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along with heightened recruitment of conflict-monitoring regions, such as the ACC (Braver,
2012; Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Kerns et al., 2005; MacDonald et al., 2000). One
neuroimaging study found increased DLPFC and parietal activity in proactive versus reactive
control in healthy participants (Lesh et al., 2013). In addition, schizophrenia patients with
impaired cognitive control did not show significant DLPFC activation in proactive control
conditions, but showed similar activation to control subjects during reactive control (Lesh et al.,
2013). However, another study found both decreased conflict and error-related activity in the
patients’ACC, consistent with impaired reactive control, and no post-conflict or post-error
behavioral adjustment was found, suggesting impaired proactive control. It suggests that
impaired conflict monitoring in the ACC leads to a deficit in cognitive control by failing to
prevent interference of irrelevant information (Kerns et al., 2005). Therefore, the DMC theory is
supported by the sustained and transient activation of the DLPFC for proactive and reactive
control, respectively, as well as environmentally appropriate engagement of the ACC.
Other studies have also found distinct activation of these two control mechanisms
(Braver, 2012) and a shift between these two models under different manipulations (Speer,
Jacoby, & Braver, 2003). In Speer’s (2003) study, participants were instructed to maintain a
short (1 to 6) or long list (6 to 11) of words over a delay then indicate whether the probe words
were on the list. In the less demanding short-list block, activation of the left inferior PFC only
increased when triggered by a probe word; while in long-list block, lateral PFC activation was
sustained during the delay until the probe onset. This suggests that mnemonic processes are
preferentially engaged during the delay response period (sustained top-down processing) and
retrieval period (transient processing) depending on the task demands.
Many tasks have been used to assess proactive and reactive control. I will focus here on
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two of the most common, which I propose to use in the current study, the AX Continuous
Performance Task (AX-CPT) and the Stroop task. AX-CPT is frequently used to assess proactive
control (Braver et al., 2001; Braver, Satpute, Rush, Racine, & Barch, 2005; Locke & Braver,
2008; Paxton et al., 2008). During the AX-CPT, participants are required to make a response to
the target probe, which is the letter “X,” but only when it follows the cue letter “A” (target trial).
When the probe “X” follows any other letters non-target responses are required. Target trials
(AX trials) are presented with high frequency compared to non-target trials. Thus, during these
non-target trials, participants must inhibit the prepotent response to the probe “X”. This task
measures goal maintenance and updating. All the responses to the probe rely on the memory of
the cue letter, which must be maintained during the delay between cue and probe for the rapid
target decisions. Therefore, the AX-CPT provides a way to measure the proactive control
required for this goal-directed behavior.
The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) is frequently used to assess reactive control (Gonthier,
Braver, & Bugg, 2016; Lesh et al., 2013). In the Stroop task, the color words are presented in
congruent or incongruent color inks (e.g. Congruent: the word “GREEN” in green ink;
Incongruent: the word “GREEN” in red ink). The participants are instructed to read the words or
name the colors. Word reading is faster and more automatic than color naming (MacLeod, 1991).
In addition, frequent congruent trials bias participants to respond faster and more accurately rely
on word reading. Thus, when the infrequent incongruent trials are presented, participants have to
inhibit the strong tendency to read the word and switch to the weaker color naming response to
avoid incorrect responses. Unlike the AX-CPT, making a response in the Stroop test does not
require contextual information or maintenance of a goal, but simply a reaction to the current
stimuli. As expected by this task design, evidence shows that the color naming on incongruent
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trials in the Stroop task reflects reactive control (Botvinick et al., 2001; Gonthier et al., 2016;
Lesh et al., 2013).
Anxiety has been shown to impact cognitive control processes, and some theoretical
models suggest that anxiety might differentially impact proactive and reactive control (Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Hu, Bauer, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2012). However, little work
has examined its specific impact on these two types of cognitive control (Krug & Carter, 2012;
Lamm, Pine, & Fox, 2013). Anxiety is an aversive emotional and motivational state in
threatening conditions (Eysenck et al., 2007). The main distinction between its two main types,
state and trait anxiety, is that state anxiety is a temporary unpleasant emotional response to some
perceived threat, whereas trait anxiety is a personality characteristic in which individuals
experience more frequent and more intense anxiety, even in the absence of external threat
(Spielberger & Sydeman, 1994). State anxiety increases the allocation of attention resources to
threat-related stimuli internally and externally, which was initially posited to impair performance
(Sarason, 1988). However, there is also evidence that anxiety does not impair performance
(Blankstein, Flett, Boase, & Toner, 1990; Blankstein, Toner, & Flett, 1989). Eysenck and
colleagues (2007)’s attentional control theory (ACT) attempted to reconcile this. They proposed
that anxiety affects processing efficiency, resulting in the need for compensatory processes to
spare performance (Eysenck et al., 2007). Anxiety is thought to impair processing efficiency by
restricting the capacity of working memory; indeed high anxiety subjects have been found to
have less capacity than those low on anxiety (Darke, 1988). In a working memory test, subjects
heard a series of letters or digits then were instructed to report the items in a reverse order, high
anxiety subjects performed worse than low anxiety subjects (Moran, 2016). It suggests that goal
maintenance in proactive control also depends on working memory. Proactive control, which

6

relies on a goal-directed attentional system is posited to be impaired by anxiety. However,
anxiety may lead to a decrease of attentional control, and impairment of inhibition and shifting
and that allows for increased reactive control which relies on stimulus-driven attention (Eysenck
et al., 2007).
Anxiety may also impact utilization of proactive and reactive control by evaluating
benefits and costs to avoid punishment. For example, in a punishment-oriented motivation study,
improvement in error rate and RT were predicted by high punishment sensitivity, which suggests
these individual utilized proactive control after evaluating the punishment and cost (Savine,
Beck, Edwards, Chiew, & Braver, 2010). In a working memory task, Fales et al (2008) found
that a negative mood induction led to a shift from sustained to transient activation in working
memory regions. Interestingly, this pattern of heightened transient versus sustained activation
was evident in high anxious individuals even following a neutral mood induction, in contrast to
the sustained working memory area activation in low anxious participants. The authors suggested
that due to limited working memory capacity anxiety caused the shifting of attention allocation
to unpredictable threats and anxiety-related internal thoughts, thus limiting the availability of
working memory for the processing task-irrelevant information. This interferes with maintaining
leads ongoing task goals and may impair performance or necessitate more resources to perform
appropriately. This suggests a relation between anxiety and utilization of proactive (sustained
activity) and reactive (transient activity) control which is consistent with the DMC theory.
Even though some initial evidence suggests anxiety differentially affects proactive and
reactive control, more investigation is needed. The differential effect of state anxiety on
proactive versus reactive control has not yet been directly compared in the same individuals. The
aim of my work is examine how proactive and reactive control will be effected under state
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anxiety by conducting an AX-CPT and a Stroop task under threat of shock and safety. My
hypothesis was: when we induce state anxiety during the AX-CPT test and the Color Naming
Stroop test under threat conditions, we would find that proactive control (BX trial type in the
AX-CPT) is impaired relative to safe conditions, while reactive control (color naming on
incongruent trials in the Stroop task) is increased.
Method
Participants
Seventy-three participants aged 18 to 35 were recruited from the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee. All participants were granted 2 hours of course extra credit and one $10
gift card. All participants had normal color vision. The sequences of the AX-CPT and Stroop
tasks were counterbalanced across participants. Ten participants were excluded because of
technical problems with shock delivery. Two participants were excluded because less than 50%
of trials were answered correctly. One participant had poor performance in the AX-CPT and the
other in the Stroop task. They were dropped from both tasks so the samples were the same across
task. (Aged 18-39, mean = 21.4, SD = 4.1. NMale = 9, NFemale = 52. NWhite, not of Hispanic Origin = 42,
NLatino/Hispanic = 5, NMiddle Eastern = 4, NAfrican American/Black = 3, NAsian/Pacific Islander = 3, NAmerican
Indian/Alaskan Native

= 1, NOther = 1.)
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Figure 1. (a) Each trial started from a color word shown on the screen for 600ms,
followed by a white fixation cross shown on the screen varying from 600-1400ms. The
participants were asked to respond to the color of the words but not the meaning by pressing the
same color button on the keyboard. There were two word conditions: Congruent and
Incongruent. In congruent condition, the word reading and color naming were the same whereas
the incongruent are not. (b) Each trial started when a white cue appeared on screen for 300ms
then masked for 400ms. A fixation appeared on the screen for 1600ms, then the target was
presented for 300ms, then masked for 400ms. The ITI varied from 600-1400ms, then the next
trials started. Participants had 2100ms to respond.

Stroop Task Design and Procedures
This Stroop task was modified from the classic color-word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935).
Each trial included a color word shown on the screen for 600ms, followed by a white fixation
cross varying from 600-1400ms. The participants was asked to respond to the color of the text
9

the word is displayed in but not the meaning of the word by pressing the same color button on
the keyboard as accurately and quickly as possible. There were two word conditions: Congruent
and Incongruent. In the congruent condition, the words ‘GREEN’, ‘RED’ and ‘BLUE’ were
presented in their own color to maintain congruence of word reading and color naming. In the
Incongruent condition, the word ‘GREEN’, ‘RED’ and ‘BLUE’ were presented in different
colors from their meaning to cause interference. For example, when the word ‘GREEN’ was
shown on the screen in the color red the participant should press the red button on the keyboard.
There were two trial conditions: safe and shock conditions. For the safe condition, there
was a 30 pixel wide blue border around the edge of the screen and participants were explicitly
told that they would not receive any shocks. For the shock conditions, the 30 pixel wide border
would be red and participants were explicitly told that they might receive shock(s) on their ankle
at any time. Before the test began, participants underwent a shock workup procedure to establish
a level of shock that was ‘Painful but can tolerable’. The electrical shock was a constant current
at this level delivered via an electrode placed on the outside of the participant’s right wrist for
500ms.
In each of six blocks, there were 35 congruent trials (70% of trials) and 15 incongruent
trials (30%), with the trial order randomly assigned. There were three safe blocks and three threat
of shock blocks (a total of 150 trials in each condition, shock and safe). Each safe block was
followed by a shock block. During the shock block, participants might receive one, two or three
electrical shock(s) on the wrist. After each block, participants rated their current anxiety level by
pressing a button between 1 (low anxiety) and 7 (high anxiety).
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AX-CPT Task Design and Procedures
The AX-CPT task consisted of continuous trials with a single letter presented on the
computer, with each letter requiring a button press response from the participant. In each trial, a
letter (cue) was displayed and followed by its paired letter (probe), which together comprised a
Cue-Probe sequence. There were four Cue-Probe sequence trial types: AX, AY, BX and BY. The
‘A’ represented the target cue while ‘B’ represented the non-target cue, ‘X’ represented the
target probe while the ‘Y’ represented the non-target probe. During the AX target trials, only the
letters A and X were presented. However, in addition to A, B, X, and Y the non-target trials (AY,
BX, and BY) also included the letters E, F, G, J, M, P, Q, R, S, U and V. The participants were
instructed to response to each letter (cue and probe) by pressing button ‘1 (Yes, the target
sequence completed) or ‘2’ (No, the target sequence did not complete). That is, participants only
pressed ‘1’ when letter X (probe) was following the letter A (cue), which completed a target cueprobe sequence. Other than this, participants were instructed to press ‘2’ to any cues and probe
(e.g. B-X, A-G, M-Q). Each trial started when a white cue appeared on screen for 300ms then
was masked for 400ms (see Figure 1(a)). After a fixation appeared on the screen for 1600ms, the
target appeared on the screen for 300ms then was masked for 400ms. The ITI varied from 6001400ms. Participants had 2100ms to make a response.
To manipulate proactive control, we attempted to instill a prepotent response to respond
to the X (with a ‘1’ button press) by presenting the AX target trial type more frequently (70% of
trials) than the non-target trial types: 10% each for AY, BX, and BY. See Figure 1(b) for a
depiction of the task design.
There were two trial conditions: safe and shock conditions. The shock procedure was the
same as the Stroop test. The safe block had the 30 pixel wide blue border around the edge of the
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screen and 30 pixel wide red border for shock blocks. Participants were explicitly told whether
they would receive any shocks or not before each block.
The whole AX-CPT task consisted of 10 blocks, with 5 safe and 5 shock blocks. Each
safe block was followed by a shock block. In each block there were 40 trials, including 28 AX, 4
AY, 4 BX and 4 BY trials. All trial types were presented in a random order. During the five
shock blocks participants received between 0 and 3 shocks (one block each of 0, 1, and 3 shocks,
2 blocks with 2 shocks). The order of these blocks was randomly assigned among shock blocks.
Before the experimental trials, participants conducted a practice block. Only when
participants achieved 50% correct could they move on to the experimental trials. After each
block, subjects were asked to rate their anxiety on a 7 point scale (1 = low, 7 = high).
Data Analysis
Stroop. 2.56% trials were excluded from analysis due to lack of response, 0.18% trials
were excluded because the RT was less than 200ms, 1.91% trials were excluded because the
shock occurred during this trial, and 0.76% trials were excluded because of RT longer than 3
standard deviations from the mean.
All accuracy and RT data were examined using a 2 (Condition: Safe vs. Threat) × 2 (Trial
Type: Congruent vs. Incongruent) repeated measures ANOVA. A series of paired t-tests were
used for the comparisons among conditions and trial types.
AX-CPT. The dependent variables will be accuracy and reaction time for responses to the
probe letters. Only trials for which participants responded correctly to the cue will be analyzed.
2% trials were excluded from analysis because the shock occurred, 4.28% trials were excluded
because of incorrect or no response to the cue. The median of the reaction time (RT) of each
participant for each condition and trial type were used for the RT analysis.
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AX-CPT accuracy and RT were examined using a 2 (Condition: Safe vs. Threat) × 4
(Trial Type: AX, AY, BX and BY) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Paired ttests were used for the comparisons among conditions and trial types.
In the repeated measure ANOVAs, if the Mauchly’s test of sphericity assumption was
violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon was used to correct the degrees of freedom.
Results
Stroop
The anxiety rating shows the shock did make participants felt significant more anxious
t(120) = 4.411, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .399.
Accuracy
A Condition (Safe, Threat) × Trial Type (Congruent, Incongruent) repeated measures
ANOVA yielded significant interaction, F(1,60) = 4.246, p = .044, ηp2 = .007, and main effects
of Condition, F(1,60) = 9.404, p = .003, ηp2 = .135, and Trial Type, F(1,60) = 87.436, p < .001,
ηp2 = .593 (See Figure 2(a)). The performance for incongruent trial type was poorer than
congruent for both safe and threat conditions. However, as reflected by the interaction threat
affected performance differently for congruent and incongruent trials. For incongruent trials,
participants made fewer errors under threat of shock than during safety, t(60) = 3.002, p = .004,
Cohen’s d = .388. However, error rates did not differ between threat and safe for congruent trials,
t(60) = .980, p = .331, Cohen’s d = .127. This suggests that anxiety facilitated performance on
the incongruent trials, in which reactive control is required to prevent engaging in the dominant
word reading response.
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Figure 2. (a) Mean error rate for Stroop task for the safe and shock conditions for
congruent and incongruent trials Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. (b) Mean
reaction time for Stroop task for safe and shock conditions across trial types. Error bars represent
the standard error of the mean. Asterisk represents significant RT difference. * p < 0.05; **p <
0.01.
Reaction Time
The identical Condition × Trial Type ANOVA was conducted with RT as the dependent
14

variable. This ANOVA yielded a significant interaction, F(1,60) = 6.362, p = .014, ηp2 = .096,
and main effect of Trial Type, F(1,60) = 69.855, p < .001, ηp2 = .538 (See Figure 2(b)). As
expected RTs were faster for the easier congruent trials compared to incongruent trials.
Following up on the significant interaction revealed that RTs were slower for congruent trials
during shock compared to safe conditions, t(60) = 2.064, p = .043, Cohen’s d = .267.
AX-CPT
The anxiety rating shows the shock did make participants felt significant more anxious
t(120) = 7.086, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .642.
Accuracy
A Condition (Safe, Threat) × Trial Type (AX, AY, BX and BY) repeated measures
ANOVA yielded a significant interaction, F(2.469, 148.134 = 4.675, p = .004, ηp2 = .072, and
main effect of Trial Type, F(1.803, 108.168) = 127.966, p < .001, ηp2 = .681, but no main effect
of Condition (See Figure 3(a)). Post-hoc comparisons across threat and safe conditions
(Bonferroni corrected) showed that the error rate for the AX trial type was significant lower than
AY (p < .001), and BX (p < .001), but not BY (p = .088). Participants also made more errors
during AY than BX (p < .001) and BY (p < .001) trials. The error rate for BX was also higher
than BY (p < .001). Following up on the significant interaction, I found that the error rate was
higher in the threat compared to safe condition for the BX, t(60) = 2.109, p = .039, Cohen’s d
= .272, and BY, t(60) = 2.690, p = .009, Cohen’s d = .347, trial types. There was a trend for
fewer errors under threat of shock in the AX condition, t(60) = 1.906, p = .061, Cohen’s d
= .246.
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Figure 3. (a) Mean error rate for the AX-CPT task for safe and shock conditions across
trial types. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. (b) Mean reaction time for the
AX-CPT task for safe and shock conditions across trial types. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean. Asterisk represents significant RT differences. * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Reaction Time
A Condition (Safe, Threat) × Trial Type (AX, AY, BX and BY) ANOVA was calculated
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with RT as the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect of Trial Type, F(2.085,
123.007) = 499.809, p < .001, ηp2 = .894, but no main effect for Condition, F(1, 59) = .530, p
= .470, ηp2 = .009, or Condition × Trial Type interaction, F(2.085,123.007) = 499.809, p = .933,
ηp2 = .002 (See Figure 3(b)). Post-hoc comparisons across threat and safe conditions (Bonferroni
corrected) showed that RT for the AX trial type was faster than AY (p < .001), slower than BX
(p = .004), and did not differ from BY (p = .090). RT for AY was also slower than BX (p < .001)
and BY (p < .001). RT during BX was not significant faster than BY (p = .602). Despite the lack
of interaction we did conduct post-hoc comparisons to test our a priori hypotheses. There was no
significant difference between threat and safe during the AY, BX, or BY conditions, F (1, 59) =
0.530, p = .470, ηp2 = .002. We did find that RT was significantly slower during threat than safe
for AX trials, t(60) = 3.336, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .431].
Discussion
Our study’s purpose was to assess how state anxiety impacts two distinct forms of
cognitive control. The current results support our hypothesis that state anxiety impairs proactive
control but enhances reactive control.
The Stroop task served as our index of reactive control. In the Stroop task, contextual
information or trial-by-trial maintenance of a goal is not required to make a response, but simply
a reaction to the current stimulus. Together the dominant tendency to read the word and the high
frequency of congruent trials in our design biased participants to respond relying more on
wording reading, which is more automatic than color naming. Thus, word reading is the
prepotent response and in order to respond correctly on incongruent trials individuals react
quickly to engage control mechanisms to avoid word reading resulting in an incorrect response
(Botvinick et al., 2001). Evidence shows that color naming on incongruent trials in the Stroop
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task reflects reactive control, particularly when the majority of trials are congruent (Botvinick et
al., 2001; Gonthier et al., 2016; Lesh et al., 2013). Our results are consistent with previous
findings that the error rate for the incongruent condition (collapsed across safe and shock
conditions) was higher than congruent condition (Botvinick et al., 2001; MacLeod, 1991). It has
been suggested this incongruence causes conflict which requires the conflict monitoring system
to be triggered and attention is deployed to modify behavior to meet this task goal. Reactive
control is related to this conflict monitoring system and enhancement of this system facilitates
reactive control performance (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Kerns et al., 2005). Activation of the ACC,
a region implicated in conflict monitoring and cognitive control, has been shown to be higher
when frequency of incongruent trials was lower (C. S. Carter et al., 2000).
Considering the effects of state anxiety, as we hypothesized, we found that fewer errors
were made on incongruent trials in the shock condition compared to safe. That is, under threat of
shock, the task-irrelevant process (word reading) was inhibited and the task-relevant process (ink
color naming) was enhanced, and as a result fewer incorrect responses were made. When the
color naming is incongruent with word reading, two incompatible response tendencies are
activated (word reading, color naming) and the conflict monitoring system is engaged to inhibit
the prepotent word reading response. Our findings indicate that state anxiety enhances inhibition
of word reading to modify behavior to avoid making an incorrect response. This result is
consistent with a similar Stroop test in which shock threat slowed responding during neutral
Stroop trials but facilitated responding on incongruent trials (Hu et al., 2012). This facilitation
could be interpreted in keeping with the attention narrowing hypothesis that anxiety decreases
the processing of task irrelevant dimensions (Callaway, 1959; Callaway & Dembo, 1958; Chajut
& Algom, 2003; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007).
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As noted above, the inhibition necessary for incongruent Stroop trials requires reactive
control, thus our findings support our hypothesis that state anxiety would improve reactive
control. This is consistent with previous findings. N2 amplitudes, which are generated by the
ACC and associated with enhanced attentional performance, have been found to be greater to
incongruent versus congruent flankers prior to a correct response suggesting greater involvement
of ACC in conflict monitoring and successfully overcoming response conflict (Schmid, Kleiman,
& Amodio, 2015). Another study found only the N2 amplitudes of congruent but not incongruent
flankers significantly increased when anxiety increased (Dennis & Chen, 2009; Yeung, Holroyd,
& Cohen, 2005). The authors suggest that under higher anxiety the N2 is enhanced in low
conflict condition and the reduced N2 difference may reflect a compensatory mechanism to
minimize potential attentional interference in the face of threat. These findings suggest that threat
may facilitate reactive control by enhancing the activity of ACC. The ACC is a critical node in
the conflict monitoring system, which responsible for the overriding prepotent responses,
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). fMRI studies have shown that during high conflict correct
responses, the ACC is responsible for conflict monitoring including error detection and
behavioral correction, and it is the only area that shows greater activation when behavior is
subsequently adjusted after conflict is detected. (Cameron S. Carter et al., 1998; Garavan, Ross,
Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002). Therefore, the anxiety enhance the reactive control by
facilitating the conflict monitoring system of ACC.
If state anxiety enhances reactive control, then it might be expected that RT for the
incongruent trial type may also be facilitated, along with accuracy. However, no significant RT
difference was found for incongruent trials between safe and threat. This suggests that state
anxiety facilitated accurate performance and that this did not come at the expense of a longer

19

response time.
Turning to proactive control, our AX-CPT task findings indicate that regardless of threat
condition both BX and AY trial types, which required more context-based responding (i.e.,
maintenance of the cue-probe relationship), resulted in more errors than AX and BY trial types.
This result is consistent with other findings (D. M. Barch, Carter, MacDonald, Braver, & Cohen,
2003; Cohen et al., 1999b; Lopez-Garcia et al., 2016; MacDonald Iii et al., 2005). In addition,
the error rate for AY trials was significantly higher than the other three trial types and no
significant difference was found between safe and threat condition. Thus, as is intended the high
frequency of the AX trials established a prepotent response tendency, which impaired accuracy
on AY and BX trials as participants were biased to respond incorrectly. For these conditions
more effort was required to maintain and update the task goal and inhibit the prepotent response
and prevent a false alarm response. Overall, the pattern of findings across the four trial types is
largely consistent with previous work (D. M. Barch et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 1999b; LopezGarcia et al., 2016).
As we hypothesized, the introduction of state anxiety resulted in more errors on trials
demanding more proactive control, in this case both BX and BY trials. For BX trials, the
occurrence of probe X biased participants to respond as though it were a target (AX) trial. To
properly respond in the BX condition, the contextual information provided by the cue B should
be used in an inhibitory fashion to override the tendency to false alarm in response to the probe
X (Braver et al., 2001). Braver and his colleagues (2001) claimed that both attention and
inhibitory functions in the AX-CPT test are subserved by an internal representation of context
information within DLPFC. This context-necessitated inhibition requires proactive control in the
BX trial type.
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Anxiety is thought to impair processing efficiency by restricting the capacity of working
memory (Darke, 1988) and increasing the allocation of attention resources to threat-related
stimuli internally and externally, thus impairing performance (Sarason, 1988). Following this
logic, we expected performance on BX trials to be impaired under anxiety as they require more
attention and maintenance to prevent a false alarm response to the “X”. Indeed we found the
error rate for BX was higher in the threat than safe condition. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that anxiety impairs proactive control. Specifically, anxiety impaired the override of
the prepotent response to the probe X, which requires maintenance of the contextual information
provided by the B cue during the delay. Because working memory function is assumed to be
involved in tasks of delayed contingent response (Braver et al., 2001), it is suggested that state
anxiety occupied more working memory resources and impaired the goal-driven system by
insufficiently maintaining task-related information, which caused more errors.
In addition to threat’s impact on BX trials we also somewhat unexpectedly found that
threat similarly impacted BY performance, such that more errors were made in threat compared
to safe condition. This may be caused by the need for more attention and utilization of working
memory allocated to the infrequent non-target cue B. In contrast to the easier AX trials, the BY
trials required more proactive control, and thus were also affected by threat of shock like the BX
trials.
The RT results show that the AY trial type required more time than other types to
respond, which is consistent with other findings (D. M. Barch et al., 2003; Deanna M. Barch et
al., 2004; Braver et al., 2001; Lopez-Garcia et al., 2016). AY responses are thought to be slowed
because the anticipated target response to an “X” needs to be inhibited which requires additional
time. The RT for BX trial type was faster than AX and AY, but not BY. Similar results were also
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found in other studies (D. M. Barch et al., 2003; Deanna M. Barch et al., 2004). It suggests the
non-target cue B can facilitate the response speed. However, no significant RT difference was
found between safe and threat for AY and BX trial types.
Interestingly, the only significant RT difference between shock and safe conditions was
found for the AX trial type, with RT being slower under state anxiety. This is similar to the RT
performance for the congruent trial type in the Stroop test. In both cases these trials were
presented with high frequency (70%) establishing a more automatic prepotent response. Across
tasks we find that state anxiety compromised speed in performing these simplest task conditions.
It suggests that state anxiety may slow down response speed by relocating attention to potential
threat.
Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) claims the anxiety impairs efficient
functioning of the goal directed attentional system and enhances processing by the stimulusdriven attentional system. Thus, attentional control is decreased, but attention to threat-related
stimuli is enhanced. Inhibition and shifting are the two central executive functions supporting
processing efficiency that are adversely affected by anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007). Studies have
found that when task demands on working memory capacity are high, the adverse effects of
distractors on task performance increased (Graydon & Eysenck, 1989). Individuals with lower
working memory capacity are more susceptible to distractors (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004).
In a selective attention task, the same adverse effects of distractors was found and it was greater
when these distractors were involved with shifting function (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding,
2004). Attentional Control Theory suggests the anxiety occupies the limited working memory
capacity with threat-related information, both task-relevant and irrelevant. They posit that this
leads to low central executive performance, but high performance on conflict monitoring. In
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other words, anxiety may unitize more working memory resources on relocation of attention to
task-unrelated stimuli, which serves to enhance reactive control but impair proactive control.
In keeping with this, we found that state anxiety differentially impacted reactive and
proactive cognitive control during Stroop and AX-CPT test. State anxiety enhanced accuracy on
incongruent Stroop trials, which require reactive control, but impaired performance on BX and
BY trials in the AX-CPT, which depend on proactive control. As would follow from the effects
of anxiety on attention and working memory described above, we posit that state anxiety
enhanced attention to threat, in this case via the conflict monitoring system, to quickly modify
behavior on the incongruent Stroop trials. In contrast, state anxiety impaired goal maintenance
on the AY, BX and BY trials by occupying limited working memory capacity, leading to
impaired context processing. This is consistent with a recent study that found that low anxiety
subjects were engaged with proactive control driven by DLPFC and high anxiety subjects were
engaged with reactive control by conflicted related dorsal ACC (Schmid et al., 2015). The
distinction between proactive and reactive control in the DMC theory is supported by this
differential task performance under threat.
A limitation of this task is that the inter-stimulus interval for the AX-CPT was quite
short. A longer duration would require more working memory resources to maintain the cue
information, which is highly relied on for proactive control. Even though we found a difference
in error rate for BX trials, no speed difference was found. If the inter-stimulus interval was
longer, thus increasing the difficulty of goal maintenance, RT may also have been impaired on
proactive control trials, such as the BX.
Conclusion
We found that state anxiety differentially impacted proactive and reactive cognitive
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control. State anxiety enhanced reactive control, potentially by facilitating the conflict
monitoring system, enabling modification of behaviors according to environmental changes.
Enhanced reactive control under threat may have adaptive functions in altering ongoing behavior
to respond appropriately to potential threats. In contrast, state anxiety impaired performance in
situations requiring proactive control. Additional goal maintenance demands in these proactive
control-demanding tasks likely impinges on limited working memory capacity. The processing
of task irrelevant information, particularly potential threat, interferes with execution of ongoing
task goals, and impairs performance. The interesting additional finding of state anxiety slowing
of responses in simple task conditions also supports the idea that potential threat occupies limited
resources and impacts task performance. In sum, state anxiety differentially impacts reactive and
proactive control, in ways that reflect adaptive responding to potential threats in the environment
and that disadvantage performance in more complex conditions that require maintenance of
contextual information to facilitate performance.

24

References

Asaad, W. F., Rainer, G., & Miller, E. K. (2000). Task-specific neural activity in the primate
prefrontal cortex. J Neurophysiol, 84(1), 451-459.

Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., & et al. (2001). SElective deficits in prefrontal cortex
function in medication-naive patients with schizophrenia. Arch Gen Psychiatry, 58(3),
280-288. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.58.3.280

Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., MacDonald, A. W., 3rd, Braver, T. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2003).
Context-processing deficits in schizophrenia: diagnostic specificity, 4-week course, and
relationships to clinical symptoms. J Abnorm Psychol, 112(1), 132-143.

Barch, D. M., Mitropoulou, V., Harvey, P. D., New, A. S., Silverman, J. M., & Siever, L. J.
(2004). Context-Processing Deficits in Schizotypal Personality Disorder. J Abnorm
Psychol, 113(4), 556-568. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.113.4.556

Barrett, L. F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. W. (2004). Individual differences in working memory
capacity and dual-process theories of the mind. Psychol Bull, 130(4), 553-573. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.130.4.553

Blankstein, K. R., Flett, G. L., Boase, P., & Toner, B. B. (1990). Thought listing and
endorsement measures of self-referential thinking in test anxiety. Anxiety Research, 2(2),
103-112. doi: 10.1080/08917779008249329

25

Blankstein, K. R., Toner, B. B., & Flett, G. L. (1989). Test anxiety and the contents of
consciousness: Thought-listing and endorsement measures. Journal of Research in
Personality, 23(3), 269-286. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0092-6566(89)90001-9

Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). Conflict
monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 108(3), 624-652. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.624

Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and anterior
cingulate cortex: an update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(12), 539-546. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003

Braver, T. S. (2012). The variable nature of cognitive control: a dual mechanisms framework.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2), 106-113. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.12.010

Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Keys, B. A., Carter, C. S., Cohen, J. D., Kaye, J. A., . . . Reed, B. R.
(2001). Context processing in older adults: evidence for a theory relating cognitive
control to neurobiology in healthy aging. J Exp Psychol Gen, 130(4), 746-763.

Braver, T. S., Paxton, J. L., Locke, H. S., & Barch, D. M. (2009). Flexible neural mechanisms of
cognitive control within human prefrontal cortex. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 106(18),
7351-7356. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0808187106

Braver, T. S., Satpute, A. B., Rush, B. K., Racine, C. A., & Barch, D. M. (2005). Context
Processing and Context Maintenance in Healthy Aging and Early Stage Dementia of the

26

Alzheimer's Type. Psychology and Aging, 20(1), 33-46. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.20.1.33

Callaway. (1959). The influence of amobarbital (amylobarbitone) and methamphetamine on the
focus of attention. J Ment Sci, 105(439), 382-392.

Callaway, & Dembo, D. (1958). Narrowed attention; a psychological phenomenon that
accompanies a certain physiological change. AMA Arch Neurol Psychiatry, 79(1), 74-90.

Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Botvinick, M. M., Noll, D., & Cohen, J. D. (1998).
Anterior Cingulate Cortex, Error Detection, and the Online Monitoring of Performance.
Science, 280(5364), 747-749. doi: 10.1126/science.280.5364.747

Carter, C. S., Macdonald, A. M., Botvinick, M., Ross, L. L., Stenger, V. A., Noll, D., & Cohen,
J. D. (2000). Parsing executive processes: strategic vs. evaluative functions of the anterior
cingulate cortex. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 97(4), 1944-1948.

Chajut, E., & Algom, D. (2003). Selective attention improves under stress: implications for
theories of social cognition. J Pers Soc Psychol, 85(2), 231-248.

Chan, R. C. K., Shum, D., Toulopoulou, T., & Chen, E. Y. H. (2008). Assessment of executive
functions: Review of instruments and identification of critical issues. Archives of Clinical
Neuropsychology, 23(2), 201-216. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.acn.2007.08.010

Cohen, J. D., Barch, D. M., Carter, C., & Servan-Schreiber, D. (1999a). Context-processing
deficits in schizophrenia: converging evidence from three theoretically motivated
cognitive tasks. J Abnorm Psychol, 108(1), 120-133.
27

Cohen, J. D., Barch, D. M., Carter, C., & Servan-Schreiber, D. (1999b). Context-processing
deficits in schizophrenia: Converging evidence from three theoretically motivated
cognitive tasks. J Abnorm Psychol, 108(1), 120-133. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.108.1.120

Cohen, J. D., Braver, T. S., & O'Reilly, R. C. (1996). A Computational Approach to Prefrontal
Cortex, Cognitive Control and Schizophrenia: Recent Developments and Current
Challenges. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B:
Biological Sciences, 351(1346), 1515-1527. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1996.0138

Cohen, J. D., Dunbar, K., & McClelland, J. L. (1990). On the control of automatic processes: A
parallel distributed processing account of the Stroop effect. Psychological Review, 97(3),
332-361. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.3.332

Cohen, J. D., & Servan-Schreiber, D. (1992). Context, cortex, and dopamine: A connectionist
approach to behavior and biology in schizophrenia. Psychological Review, 99(1), 45-77.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.99.1.45

Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: a reconsideration of mental
storage capacity. Behav Brain Sci, 24(1), 87-114; discussion 114-185.

Darke, S. (1988). Anxiety and working memory capacity. Cognition and Emotion, 2(2), 145-154.
doi: 10.1080/02699938808408071

Dennis, T. A., & Chen, C.-C. (2009). Trait anxiety and conflict monitoring following threat: An
ERP study. Psychophysiology, 46(1), 122-131. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00758.x

28

Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective visual attention. Annu Rev
Neurosci, 18, 193-222. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ne.18.030195.001205

Diamond, A. (2013). Executive functions. Annu Rev Psychol, 64, 135-168. doi:
10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143750

Engle, R. W., & Kane, M. J. (2003). Executive attention, working memory capacity, and a twofactor theory of cognitive control. Psychology of learning and motivation, 44, 145-199.

Eysenck, M. W., & Calvo, M. G. (1992). Anxiety and Performance: The Processing Efficiency
Theory. Cognition and Emotion, 6(6), 409-434. doi: 10.1080/02699939208409696

Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R., & Calvo, M. G. (2007). Anxiety and cognitive
performance: Attentional control theory. Emotion, 7(2), 336-353. doi: 10.1037/15283542.7.2.336

Garavan, H., Ross, T. J., Murphy, K., Roche, R. A. P., & Stein, E. A. (2002). Dissociable
Executive Functions in the Dynamic Control of Behavior: Inhibition, Error Detection,
and Correction. Neuroimage, 17(4), 1820-1829. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2002.1326

Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1995). Cellular basis of working memory. Neuron, 14(3), 477-485.

Goldman-Rakic, P. S., Cools, A. R., & Srivastava, K. (1996). The Prefrontal Landscape:
Implications of Functional Architecture for Understanding Human Mentation and the
Central Executive [and Discussion]. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of

29

London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 351(1346), 1445-1453. doi:
10.1098/rstb.1996.0129

Gonthier, C., Braver, T. S., & Bugg, J. M. (2016). Dissociating proactive and reactive control in
the Stroop task. Mem Cognit, 44(5), 778-788. doi: 10.3758/s13421-016-0591-1

Graydon, J., & Eysenck, M. W. (1989). Distraction and cognitive performance. European
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 1(2), 161-179. doi: 10.1080/09541448908403078

Hu, K., Bauer, A., Padmala, S., & Pessoa, L. (2012). Threat of bodily harm has opposing effects
on cognition. Emotion, 12(1), 28-32. doi: 10.1037/a0024345

Kerns, J. G., Cohen, J. D., MacDonald III, A. W., Johnson, M. K., Stenger, V. A., Aizenstein, H.,
& Carter, C. S. (2005). Decreased Conflict- and Error-Related Activity in the Anterior
Cingulate Cortex in Subjects With Schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry,
162(10), 1833-1839. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.162.10.1833

Koechlin, E., & Summerfield, C. (2007). An information theoretical approach to prefrontal
executive function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(6), 229-235. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.04.005

Krug, M. K., & Carter, C. S. (2012). Proactive and reactive control during emotional interference
and its relationship to trait anxiety. Brain Res, 1481, 13-36. doi:
10.1016/j.brainres.2012.08.045

30

Lamm, C., Pine, D. S., & Fox, N. A. (2013). Impact of negative affectively charged stimuli and
response style on cognitive-control-related neural activation: An ERP study. Brain and
Cognition, 83(2), 234-243. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2013.07.012

Lavie, N., Hirst, A., de Fockert, J. W., & Viding, E. (2004). Load theory of selective attention
and cognitive control. J Exp Psychol Gen, 133(3), 339-354. doi: 10.1037/00963445.133.3.339

Lesh, T. A., Westphal, A. J., Niendam, T. A., Yoon, J. H., Minzenberg, M. J., Ragland, J. D., . . .
Carter, C. S. (2013). Proactive and reactive cognitive control and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex dysfunction in first episode schizophrenia. Neuroimage Clin, 2, 590-599. doi:
10.1016/j.nicl.2013.04.010

Locke, H. S., & Braver, T. S. (2008). Motivational influences on cognitive control: behavior,
brain activation, and individual differences. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci, 8(1), 99-112.

Lopez-Garcia, P., Lesh, T. A., Salo, T., Barch, D. M., MacDonald, A. W., 3rd, Gold, J. M., . . .
Carter, C. S. (2016). The neural circuitry supporting goal maintenance during cognitive
control: a comparison of expectancy AX-CPT and dot probe expectancy paradigms. Cogn
Affect Behav Neurosci, 16(1), 164-175. doi: 10.3758/s13415-015-0384-1

MacDonald, A. W., Cohen, J. D., Stenger, A. V., & Carter, C. S. (2000). Dissociating the Role of
the Dorsolateral Prefrontal and Anterior Cingulate Cortex in Cognitive Control. Science,
288(5472), 1835-1838. doi: 10.1126/science.288.5472.1835

31

MacDonald Iii, A. W., Goghari, V. M., Hicks, B. M., Flory, J. D., Carter, C. S., & Manuck, S. B.
(2005). A Convergent-Divergent Approach to Context Processing, General Intellectual
Functioning, and the Genetic Liability to Schizophrenia. Neuropsychology, 19(6), 814821. doi: 10.1037/0894-4105.19.6.814

MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: an integrative review.
Psychol Bull, 109(2), 163-203.

McElree, B. (2001). Working memory and focal attention. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn,
27(3), 817-835.

Miller, E. K., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annu
Rev Neurosci, 24, 167-202. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167

Monsell, S., & Driver, J. (2000). Control of cognitive processes: Attention and performance
XVIII (Vol. 18): MIT Press.

Moran, T. P. (2016). Anxiety and working memory capacity: A meta-analysis and narrative
review. Psychol Bull, 142(8), 831-864. doi: 10.1037/bul0000051

O'Reilly, R. C. (2006). Biologically Based Computational Models of High-Level Cognition.
Science, 314(5796), 91-94. doi: 10.1126/science.1127242

Oberauer, K. (2002). Access to information in working memory: exploring the focus of attention.
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn, 28(3), 411-421.

32

Paxton, J. L., Barch, D. M., Racine, C. A., & Braver, T. S. (2008). Cognitive control, goal
maintenance, and prefrontal function in healthy aging. Cereb Cortex, 18(5), 1010-1028.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhm135

Sarason, I. G. (1988). Anxiety, self-preoccupation and attention. Anxiety Research, 1(1), 3-7.
doi: 10.1080/10615808808248215

Savine, A. C., Beck, S. M., Edwards, B. G., Chiew, K. S., & Braver, T. S. (2010). Enhancement
of cognitive control by approach and avoidance motivational states. Cogn Emot, 24(2),
338-356. doi: 10.1080/02699930903381564

Schmid, P. C., Kleiman, T., & Amodio, D. M. (2015). Neural mechanisms of proactive and
reactive cognitive control in social anxiety. Cortex, 70(Supplement C), 137-145. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2015.05.030

Speer, N. K., Jacoby, L. L., & Braver, T. S. (2003). Strategy-dependent changes in memory:
effects on behavior and brain activity. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci, 3(3), 155-167.

Spielberger, C. D., & Sydeman, S. J. (1994). State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and State-Trait Anger
Expression Inventory The use of psychological testing for treatment planning and
outcome assessment (pp. 292-321). Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.

Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 18(6), 643-662. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0054651

33

Watanabe, M. (1990). Prefrontal unit activity during associative learning in the monkey.
Experimental Brain Research, 80(2), 296-309. doi: 10.1007/bf00228157

Yeung, N., Holroyd, C. B., & Cohen, J. D. (2005). ERP correlates of feedback and reward
processing in the presence and absence of response choice. Cereb Cortex, 15(5), 535-544.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhh153

34

CURRICULUM VITAE
Youcai Yang
EDUCATION
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee - Milwaukee, WI
Medical College of Wisconsin, WI
PhD candidate in Experimental Psychology
Master in Experimental Psychology
Northeast Normal University - Changchun, Jilin, China
Bachelor in Bioscience
EXPERIENCE

May 2014 - May 2018
Jan 2014 - May 2014
Sept 2010 - May 2014
Sept 2002 - June 2006

Graduate Assistant
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, WI
August 2010 to Present
 Led a team of 10 research assistants to complete two human and computer interaction based
emotion and cognitive control tasks, using Qualtrics to design, survey and collect data,
analyzed using SPSS.
 Directed a team to completion of an eye-tracking and visual cognition experiment, six
months ahead of expected deadline.
 Teach undergraduate courses 'Psychology Statistics' 'Research Methods'; Online courses;
Eye-Tracking method and SPSS.
 Grade, analyze and track students’ performance in each semester while providing feedback
and strategies to students at different levels.
 Analyzed behavior and eye movement when they were reading web page experience based
on over 100 participants.
 Deliver conference presentations about my research on implicit learning and cognitive
control. (2012, 2014 Cognitive Neuroscience Annual Meeting, 2014 Society for
Neuroscience).
Senior Teacher
Zhuhai Experimental High School - Zhuhai, CN
August 2006 to June 2010
 Taught biology courses for four years, including a course that tested as the most difficult on
Chinese college entrance exam.
 Designed teaching materials and tests which monitored teaching quality, provided feedback
to the school committee.
 Supervised teaching performance while providing training, skill development, evaluation and
planning to new teachers.



RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION
Zhao, N., Zhang, X., Yang, Y., Song, C., He, B. & Xu, B.(2018). The effects of treadmill
exercise on autophagy in hippocampus of APP/PS1 Transgenic mice. (NeuroReport, SCI, In
Press.)
Yang, Y., Miskovich, T. & Larson, C.L. (2018). State Anxiety Impairs Proactive But
Enhances Reactive Control. (Ready to be published in Emotion. SSCI.)
35









Yang, Y., Hanson, R., Coutinho, M.V.C., Greene, A.J., & Hannula, D.E.(2018). Contextual
Cueing is Inflexible and Best Characterized as Associative Rather than Relational Learning.
(Ready to be published in Journal of Experimental Psychology. SSCI.)
Yang, Y., Miskovich, T. & Larson, C.L. (2017). How does anxiety affect cognitive control?
Proactive and reactive control under state anxiety. Poster session presented at Wisconsin
Symposium on Emotion. Madison, WI
Yang, Y., Greene, A.J.& Hannula, D.E. (2014). Is implicit memory flexible? An eyemovement contextual cueing task’. Poster session presented at Milwaukee Chapter SFN 2011
Annual Meeting. Milwaukee, WI.
Yang, Y., Coutinho, M. V. C., Greene, A.J. & Hannula, D.E. (2014). Is implicit memory
flexible? An eye-movement contextual cueing task. Poster session presented at Cognitive
Neuroscience Society Annual Meeting. Boston, MA
Greene, A.J., Hopkins, L., Leo, P., Yang, Y., Hinman, A., Heffernan, P.H., Figueira, S.,
Browning, E., Balling, K., & Kattan, O. (2012). The Hippocampus In Inference: Distinct
Hippocampal Activation For Implicit Versus Explicit Performance. Poster session presented
in Cognitive Neuroscience Society Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL
Leo, P., Hopkins, L., Yang, Y. Greene, A.J.(2012). Hippocampal Involvement in Implicit
Memory. Poster session presented at Milwaukee Chapter SfN 2011 Annual Meeting.
Milwaukee, WI.
 Sigma Xi Member, 2013-2014







AWARDS
Distinguished Teaching Award, 2007, 2008, 2009,
Zhuhai Experimental High School
Excellent Young Teacher, 2007, 2008, 2009,
Zhuhai Experimental High School
Distinguished Instructor Award of Zhuhai Youth Science & Technology Innovation
Competition, 2009
Zhuhai City
Teaching Assistantship, 2010,2011,2012,2013,2014,2015,2016
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
UWM Travel Award, 2012, 2014
University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

SKILLS
Trilingual: | Mandarin | Cantonese | English |
Technical: | UX research | Data Analysis | Excel | SPSS | Userability Hub | Userzoom | Qualtrics
| Eye-tracking | HTML | User Experience Design | User Interface Design | Google Analytics |
Illustrator | E-Prime | Axure RP | Sketch | Optimizely | A/B Test | Microsoft Office | Photoshop |
Premiere
evaluative research product development usability testing business objectives

36

